{"id":82630,"date":"2026-11-19T09:41:04","date_gmt":"2026-11-19T09:41:04","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pelanet.mk\/?p=82630"},"modified":"2026-11-19T09:41:20","modified_gmt":"2026-11-19T09:41:20","slug":"calibrating-the-twin-shock-the-energy-and-ai-capex-correction-on-north-macedonias-gdp","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/pelanet.mk\/?p=82630","title":{"rendered":"Calibrating the Twin Shock: The Energy and AI-Capex Correction on North Macedonia&#8217;s GDP"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Calibrating the Twin Shock: The Energy and AI-Capex Correction on North Macedonia&#8217;s GDP<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">JEL classification: F41, F45, Q43, E63<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Abstract<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This paper supplies the missing quantitative calibration for the two external shocks in Steve Gligorov&#8217;s macroprudential framework for North Macedonia, developed across a four-part PelaNet commentary series in 2026.\u00b9\u207b\u2074 The first shock is energetic: Oladosu et al. (2018) estimate a US oil-price elasticity of GDP of \u22120.020.\u2075 The second is the AI-capex correction: Krugman (2026) warns that the AI boom is larger than the dot-com bubble and that its bursting would produce a deeper and slower recession.\u2076\u207b\u2078<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Using North Macedonia&#8217;s structural parameters\u2014an energy import dependency of 65.5%, an energy intensity of 335 kgoe\/1000 EUR, exports to Germany at 39.8% of total exports, and automotive components accounting for over 40% of exports\u2014we derive scaled elasticities of \u22120.06 to \u22120.10 for the energy shock and \u22120.02 to \u22120.04 for the AI-capex shock. The combined stress under a joint scenario is \u22120.08 to \u22120.14. This range is consistent with the IMF&#8217;s projection of 3.1% growth in 2026 and a current account deficit of around 5% of GDP.\u2079 The calibration strengthens Gligorov&#8217;s thesis: both shocks are large enough to activate the LIC-DSF and sovereign-bank channels, and their interaction is non-additive.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Nevertheless, one question deserves brief mention, although its details fall outside the scope of this analysis. Over the past two years, the VMRO-led government, according to this account, failed to take advantage of repeated, verified offers of foreign direct investment worth the equivalent of US$40 billion from private, non-EU investors who were not hostile to Macedonia or to Macedonian ethnic identity and who were absolutely not opposed to EU integration, should the Macedonian people make that choice.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The proposed foreign investment\u2014which has been offered\u2014would have a positive long-term effect because of its highly favorable terms, beginning with the repayment period and method, as well as the exceptionally low interest rate, unlike any offered on a loan or credit line made available in Macedonia. The expectation is that this article will attract broad interest in economic circles and prompt a reassessment of the financial factors involved in decision-making, so that the Republic of Macedonia could achieve strong development momentum, which would in turn affect the economy\u2019s overall GDP.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Compared with the analysis presented here, the apparent loss of such an opportunity underscores the decisive importance of timing and leadership\u2014and the high cost of an avoidable misjudgment. A full examination of the US$40 billion equivalent FDI offer and the government\u2019s response must, however, be left for a separate article.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<ol class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Introduction: The Corpus and the Two Missing Parameters<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Between August and November 2026, Steve Gligorov published a four-part commentary series on PelaNet arguing that North Macedonia&#8217;s exclusion from the European Union has, paradoxically, preserved the monetary instruments the country will need when the next external shock arrives.\u00b9\u207b\u2074 The August piece applies Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, and negotiation theory to the attrition of the pro-European consensus.\u2074 The October piece, co-authored with Ljupco Bosevski, sets out the game-theoretic comparison of monetary regimes and warns of a &#8220;mathematically predictable liquidity trap&#8221; in Q2 2027.\u00b3 The November piece frames AI asset concentration and the 2027 LIC-DSF activation as the exogenous trigger.\u00b2 The Washington piece delivers the policy conclusion: because the accession probability is structurally zero, Skopje should pivot to non-EU anchor investment.\u00b9<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The four pieces converge on a common analytical structure. Each identifies three converging triggers:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ol class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>The LIC-DSF reform. The IMF\u2013World Bank Debt Sustainability Framework for Low-Income Countries was overhauled in September 2026 and is expected to become operational in mid-2027.\u00b2,\u00b3,\u00b9\u2070 The framework itself is real;\u00b9\u2070 the characterization of it as an &#8220;algorithmic&#8221; mechanism producing automatic capital flight is Gligorov&#8217;s scenario framing, not an established property of the instrument.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>The energy shock. Brent crude has held near $100 per barrel amid Middle East conflict and Strait of Hormuz bottlenecks.\u00b3,\u00b9\u00b9 This shock drains reserves in hydrocarbon-dependent economies.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>The AI-capex correction. Krugman (2026) documents that AI investment and equity valuations are substantially larger than the dot-com boom, and that their bursting would produce a recession with slow recovery.\u2076\u207b\u2078 Gligorov treats the AI shock as the main channel through which LIC-DSF activation is transmitted to the euro area.\u00b2<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The first and third triggers are institutional scenarios whose timing is partly speculative. The second\u2014the energy shock\u2014is the only one that can be quantified directly against an established empirical literature. The AI-capex shock, in turn, can be quantified indirectly through North Macedonia&#8217;s export exposure. Yet across all four texts, neither shock receives a numerical magnitude.\u00b2,\u00b3<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">That is the gap this paper fills. The contribution is narrow and deliberate: it does not re-argue Gligorov&#8217;s thesis, does not attempt to validate the LIC-DSF timing, and does not engage the identity claims. It takes the two shocks that are empirically tractable and gives them a number.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<ol start=\"2\" class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>The Benchmark for the Energy Shock: Oladosu et al. (2018)<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Oladosu, Leiby, Bowman, Ur\u00eda-Mart\u00ednez, and Johnson (2018) conducted a meta-regression of the oil price elasticity of GDP for net oil-importing economies, focusing on the United States.\u2075 Their key output:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u00b7 Full range of estimates: \u22120.124 to +0.017.<br>\u00b7 Simulated US mean: \u22120.020, with a 68% confidence interval of \u22120.035 to \u22120.006, four quarters after a shock.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This is the most systematically derived benchmark available for a net oil importer. Its limitation is explicit: it is calibrated to the United States, an economy with lower oil import intensity, greater sectoral diversification, a flexible exchange rate, and the dollar&#8217;s reserve-currency status. North Macedonia shares none of these structural features.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<ol start=\"3\" class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>The Structural Adjustment for the Energy Shock<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The Oladosu et al. estimate functions as a lower bound for North Macedonia. Five structural parameters justify an upward adjustment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">3.1 Energy import dependency. North Macedonia&#8217;s energy import dependency stood at 65.5% in 2024: 65.5% of gross inland consumption was supplied by imports.\u00b9\u00b2<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">3.2 Energy intensity. North Macedonia&#8217;s energy intensity of GDP was 335 kilogrammes of oil equivalent per EUR 1,000 of GDP in 2023, roughly three times the EU average.\u00b9\u00b2 Each unit of output is produced with a substantially larger energy input and carries a correspondingly larger exposure to energy price movements.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">3.3 Oil and gas imports. Imports of oil products and natural gas accounted for approximately 5.1% of GDP in 2025, according to the German Economic Team.\u00b9\u00b3 The current account deficit widened to 4.4% of GDP in 2025 and is projected at around 5% in 2026 on higher energy imports.\u2079,\u00b9\u00b9<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">3.4 Reserve cover. Foreign reserves stood at \u20ac4.925 billion at end-December 2025 and covered about 4.5 months of imports as of mid-2025, which the NBRM Governor describes as above the global standard of three months.\u00b9\u2074,\u00b9\u2075 Adequate, but not deep relative to a sustained shock\u2014and the NBRM frames reserves as supporting the exchange rate peg of the denar against the euro.\u00b9\u2074<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">3.5 Transmission channel. The IMF finds that global energy commodity price shocks are major drivers of inflation and that North Macedonia experiences substantial spillovers through industrial activity and trade, owing to its high integration into European global value chains.\u2079<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Result: A conservative scaling factor of 3\u00d7 to 5\u00d7 relative to the US benchmark, yielding an elasticity of \u22120.06 to \u22120.10.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<ol start=\"4\" class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>The Benchmark for the AI-Capex Shock: Krugman (2026)<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In &#8220;After the Bubble Bursts&#8221; (8 November 2026), Krugman does not claim that AI is definitively a bubble. He poses a conditional question: if it is a bubble and it bursts, what are the macroeconomic consequences? His answer: a recession is near-certain, deep, and slow to recover, because the Fed has no room to cut rates (the funds rate is 4%, against 6.5% in 2001) and fiscal stimulus will be blocked.\u2076\u207b\u2078<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The key mechanism is the collapse of capex, not merely the fall in equity prices. Krugman describes it as a &#8220;Wile E. Coyote moment&#8221;: investors and lenders realise that AI companies cannot recoup the enormous outlays, and the boom falls to earth.\u00b9\u2076<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Empirical estimates:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Source Estimate<br>Bernstein &amp; Cummings (2026) The AI boom is 240% of GDP (against 160% for dot-com); the GDP decline is more than three times that of the 2001 recession; unemployment above 7%\u00b9\u2077,\u00b9\u2078<br>Krugman (2026) Recovery will be &#8220;slow and grinding&#8221;; fiscal stimulus blocked until 2029\u00b9\u2076<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">These figures are for economies directly exposed to the AI chain (the US, Korea, Taiwan). North Macedonia is indirectly exposed, which means the elasticity must be scaled down substantially.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<ol start=\"5\" class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>The Structural Adjustment for the AI-Capex Shock<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">North Macedonia has no direct AI exposure: no AI companies, no data centre boom, no hyperscaler bonds. But it is exposed through the German automotive chain.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">5.1 Export concentration. Germany is North Macedonia&#8217;s largest export partner with 39.8% of total exports in 2024 (36.5% in the first ten months of 2025).\u00b9\u2079 Automotive components account for over 40% of total exports and are predominantly linked to German automotive manufacturers.\u00b2\u2070<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">5.2 FDI concentration. FDI inflows are highly concentrated in the automotive sector, which accounts for the majority of manufacturing foreign investment.\u00b2\u2070 This means that an AI-capex correction in Germany hits both exports and investment directly.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">5.3 Transmission channel. The German automotive industry is among the most vulnerable to an AI correction, because AI capex crowds out traditional investment.\u00b2\u00b9 When German manufacturers cut investment, they cut orders for components\u2014and North Macedonia is directly exposed through its German FDI factories.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">5.4 Scaling. If the US AI correction produces a GDP decline of 3% (per Bernstein &amp; Cummings), and the German automotive sector absorbs part of that shock through reduced demand, North Macedonia\u2014as a small supplier with 40% export concentration in that sector\u2014would experience an elasticity of \u22120.02 to \u22120.04, substantially smaller than the US figure but non-zero.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<ol start=\"6\" class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Combined Calibration<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Parameter Source North Macedonia (scaled)<br>Energy shock Oladosu et al. (2018), \u22120.020 \u22120.06 to \u22120.10<br>AI-capex shock Krugman \/ Bernstein &amp; Cummings (2026) \u22120.02 to \u22120.04<br>Combined stress author&#8217;s calibration \u22120.08 to \u22120.14<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Validation against the IMF. The IMF projects growth of 3.1% in 2026 and a current account deficit of around 5% of GDP on higher energy imports.\u2079 If the energy shock is 10\u201315%, the calibrated elasticity of \u22120.06 to \u22120.10 yields a GDP hit of 0.6% to 1.5%\u2014consistent with the IMF adjustment. The AI-capex shock adds a further 0.2% to 0.4% through the export channel.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<ol start=\"7\" class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>The Interaction Between the Two Shocks<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The two shocks are not additive. They interact in two ways:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">7.1 Partial offsetting. The AI-capex collapse reduces global oil demand, which partially eases the energy shock. If the AI correction is deep, it may lower the oil price and soften the energy blow.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">7.2 Amplification through exports. But the AI-capex collapse simultaneously reduces demand for German automotive components, which hits North Macedonia&#8217;s exports. This is a direct channel that does not exist for the energy shock.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">7.3 The net effect. In a scenario where the two shocks coincide (energy shock + AI correction), the combined hit is larger than the sum if export exposure dominates, or smaller than the sum if the oil offset dominates. The calibration of \u22120.08 to \u22120.14 is a central estimate that assumes partial offsetting.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<ol start=\"8\" class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>What This Does to Gligorov&#8217;s Thesis<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">8.1 The shocks are large enough to matter. A combined hit of \u22120.08 to \u22120.14 means that in a joint scenario, North Macedonia&#8217;s GDP may fall by 0.8% to 1.4%\u2014enough to push growth below the IMF&#8217;s 3.1% baseline\u2079 and to activate pressure on reserves.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">8.2 The reserve buffer is adequate but not invulnerable. At about 4.5 months of cover,\u00b9\u2075 North Macedonia can absorb a transitory shock. But a combined persistent shock would erode reserves quarter after quarter, because the current account deficit widens while the peg constrains adjustment.\u00b9\u2074<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">8.3 The macroprudential recommendations gain quantitative footing. Gligorov&#8217;s five resilience standards\u00b2 must be sized against the combined shock, not just the energy shock. A stress test calibrated to \u22120.08 to \u22120.14 is materially more demanding than one calibrated to the US \u22120.020.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">8.4 The thesis is strengthened. If the shocks were small, Gligorov&#8217;s framework would be vulnerable to the objection that the triggers are too weak. The calibration removes that objection. Both shocks are large enough to interact with the LIC-DSF and sovereign-bank channels.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<ol start=\"9\" class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Caveats and Scope Conditions<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">First, the scaling factor is an analytical judgment, not an econometric estimate. No published study has estimated the GDP elasticity with respect to the oil price or AI capex for North Macedonia. The 3\u00d7\u20135\u00d7 range (energy) and \u22120.02 to \u22120.04 (AI) should be treated as structured priors, not precise parameters.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Second, the elasticities are partial-equilibrium objects. They capture the direct GDP response, holding other factors constant. In general equilibrium, the interaction with the peg, the LIC-DSF, and the sovereign-bank channel could amplify or dampen the effect.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Third, the IMF baseline is a model-based projection, not an out-of-sample forecast.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Fourth, the political and legal components of Gligorov&#8217;s corpus are outside the scope. The ECtHR cases Gligorov cites are real findings of Article 11 violations, but they do not in themselves establish the macroeconomic effects he attributes to them.\u00b9,\u00b3<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<ol start=\"10\" class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Conclusion: The Calibrated Twin Trigger<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Oladosu et al. (2018) provided a US benchmark of \u22120.020 for the energy shock.\u2075 Krugman and Bernstein &amp; Cummings (2026) provided an estimate for the AI-capex shock that is three times larger than dot-com.\u2076\u207b\u2078 North Macedonia is exposed to the first through 65.5% energy import dependency and 335 kgoe\/1000 EUR energy intensity,\u00b9\u00b2 and to the second through 39.8% exports to Germany and over 40% automotive components in total exports.\u00b9\u2079,\u00b2\u2070<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The scaled elasticities are \u22120.06 to \u22120.10 for energy and \u22120.02 to \u22120.04 for AI. The combined stress is \u22120.08 to \u22120.14\u2014consistent with the IMF&#8217;s projection of 3.1% growth and a 5% of GDP deficit.\u2079<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This calibration does what an empirical contribution should do for a theoretical framework: it removes a weak link and replaces it with a quantified parameter. Gligorov&#8217;s thesis was always that three shocks converge.\u00b9\u207b\u2074 Two of the external shocks now have a number. The convergence is no longer merely plausible\u2014it is calibrated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Footnotes<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u00b9 Steve Gligorov, &#8220;Advice From Washington To Macedonia: &#8216;The economy stupid!'&#8221;, PelaNet, 2026, <a href=\"https:\/\/pelanet.mk\/?p=81465\">https:\/\/pelanet.mk\/?p=81465<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u00b2 Steve Gligorov, &#8220;Malum Consilium Consultori Pessimum: When a Bad EU Plan Backfires\u2014AI Asset Concentration, Eurozone Fragility, and North Macedonia&#8217;s Macroeconomic Risks&#8221;, PelaNet, 12 November 2026, <a href=\"https:\/\/pelanet.mk\/?p=82577\">https:\/\/pelanet.mk\/?p=82577<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u00b3 Steve Gligorov and Ljupco Bosevski, &#8220;A Macedonian Blessing in Disguise: How Racial EU Exclusion and IMF Contagion Turn a Sovereign Trap into North Macedonia&#8217;s Ultimate Shield&#8221;, PelaNet, 20 October 2026, <a href=\"https:\/\/pelanet.mk\/?p=82329\">https:\/\/pelanet.mk\/?p=82329<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u2074 Steve Gligorov, &#8220;THE CULMINATING POINT OF ENLARGEMENT: Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, and the Strategic Attrition of the &#8216;8 SEPTEMBER 1991&#8217; Macedonian Pro-European Consensus&#8221;, PelaNet, 16 August 2026, <a href=\"https:\/\/pelanet.mk\/?p=81698\">https:\/\/pelanet.mk\/?p=81698<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u2075 Gbadebo Oladosu, Paul Leiby, David Bowman, Roc\u00edo Ur\u00eda-Mart\u00ednez, and Megan M. Johnson, &#8220;Impacts of Oil Price Shocks on the United States Economy: A Meta-Analysis of the Oil Price Elasticity of GDP for Net Oil-Importing Economies&#8221;, Energy Policy 115 (2018): 523\u2013544, <a href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1016\/j.enpol.2018.01.032\">https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1016\/j.enpol.2018.01.032<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u2076 Paul Krugman, &#8220;After the Bubble Bursts&#8221;, Paul Krugman Substack, 8 November 2026, <a href=\"https:\/\/paulkrugman.substack.com\/p\/after-the-bubble-bursts\">https:\/\/paulkrugman.substack.com\/p\/after-the-bubble-bursts<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u2077 Paul Krugman, interview with Jared Bernstein and Jason Furman, &#8220;Bubbel Trubbel&#8221;, Paul Krugman Podcast, 14 November 2026, <a href=\"https:\/\/paulkrugman.substack.com\">https:\/\/paulkrugman.substack.com<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u2078 Marcus Nunes, &#8220;It&#8217;s Not the Bubble, It&#8217;s the Spending&#8221;, Money Fetish (Substack), 9 November 2026, <a href=\"https:\/\/marcusnunes.substack.com\/p\/its-not-the-bubble-its-the-spending\">https:\/\/marcusnunes.substack.com\/p\/its-not-the-bubble-its-the-spending<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u2079 International Monetary Fund, Republic of North Macedonia: 2026 Article IV Consultation, Press Release No. 26\/187 (Washington, DC: IMF, 8 June 2026), <a href=\"https:\/\/www.imf.org\/en\/news\/articles\/2026\/06\/05\/pr-26187-republic-of-north-macedonia-imf-executive-board-concludes-2026-article-iv-consultation\">https:\/\/www.imf.org\/en\/news\/articles\/2026\/06\/05\/pr-26187-republic-of-north-macedonia-imf-executive-board-concludes-2026-article-iv-consultation<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u00b9\u2070 World Bank, &#8220;Debt Sustainability Framework&#8221; (reform approved September 2026, operational from mid-2027), <a href=\"https:\/\/www.worldbank.org\/en\/programs\/debt-sustainability-framework\">https:\/\/www.worldbank.org\/en\/programs\/debt-sustainability-framework<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u00b9\u00b9 International Monetary Fund, Staff Concluding Statement of the 2026 Article IV Mission, 1 April 2026, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.imf.org\/en\/news\/articles\/2026\/03\/31\/mcs-04012026-north-macedonia-staff-concluding-statement-of-the-2026-article-iv-mission\">https:\/\/www.imf.org\/en\/news\/articles\/2026\/03\/31\/mcs-04012026-north-macedonia-staff-concluding-statement-of-the-2026-article-iv-mission<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u00b9\u00b2 State Statistical Office of the Republic of North Macedonia, Energy Balances, 2024 (preliminary data), 28 October 2025, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.stat.mk\">https:\/\/www.stat.mk<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u00b9\u00b3 German Economic Team, Economic Monitor North Macedonia, 2026, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.german-economic-team.com\">https:\/\/www.german-economic-team.com<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u00b9\u2074 National Bank of the Republic of North Macedonia, &#8220;Macroeconomic stability as a support to business\u2014meeting of the Governor Slaveski with the Economic Chamber&#8221;, 23 July 2025, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nbrm.mk\">https:\/\/www.nbrm.mk<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u00b9\u2075 NBRM, official foreign reserve data for end-December 2025 (\u20ac4,925.3 million), reported in Koha, 8 January 2026, <a href=\"https:\/\/koha.mk\">https:\/\/koha.mk<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u00b9\u2076 Paul Krugman, &#8220;Paul Krugman says billions in AI borrowing will hit a &#8216;Wile E. Coyote moment&#8217; as lenders get cold feet&#8221;, Yahoo Finance, 3 November 2026, <a href=\"https:\/\/au.finance.yahoo.com\">https:\/\/au.finance.yahoo.com<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u00b9\u2077 Jared Bernstein and Ryan Cummings, &#8220;Tech Stocks Had a Terrible Day. What&#8217;s Coming Could Be Worse&#8221;, The New York Times, 6 November 2026, republished in Brad DeLong, Grasping Reality, <a href=\"https:\/\/braddelong.substack.com\/p\/crosspost-jared-bernstein-and-ryan\">https:\/\/braddelong.substack.com\/p\/crosspost-jared-bernstein-and-ryan<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u00b9\u2078 &#8220;Posthaste: Why an AI crash could be worse than the dot-com bubble bursting\u2014much worse&#8221;, Yahoo Finance \/ Financial Post, 10 November 2026, <a href=\"https:\/\/finance.yahoo.com\/news\/posthaste-why-ai-crash-could-125919973.html\">https:\/\/finance.yahoo.com\/news\/posthaste-why-ai-crash-could-125919973.html<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u00b9\u2079 Ministry of Finance of the Republic of North Macedonia, Review of Exports to Germany, 2024\u20132025, <a href=\"https:\/\/portal.mdt.gov.mk\">https:\/\/portal.mdt.gov.mk<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u00b2\u2070 Economic Institute\u2014Skopje, Global Tariffs Spillovers and Sectoral Effects, 2026, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.ek-inst.ukim.edu.mk\">https:\/\/www.ek-inst.ukim.edu.mk<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u00b2\u00b9 &#8220;Made in Germany still sells, but not like it used to&#8221;, Denar, 6 October 2026, <a href=\"https:\/\/denar.mk\">https:\/\/denar.mk<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">References<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Bernstein, Jared, and Ryan Cummings. &#8220;Tech Stocks Had a Terrible Day. What&#8217;s Coming Could Be Worse.&#8221; The New York Times, 6 November 2026. Republished in Brad DeLong, Grasping Reality. <a href=\"https:\/\/braddelong.substack.com\/p\/crosspost-jared-bernstein-and-ryan\">https:\/\/braddelong.substack.com\/p\/crosspost-jared-bernstein-and-ryan<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Economic Institute\u2014Skopje. Global Tariffs Spillovers and Sectoral Effects. 2026. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.ek-inst.ukim.edu.mk\">https:\/\/www.ek-inst.ukim.edu.mk<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">German Economic Team. Economic Monitor North Macedonia. 2026. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.german-economic-team.com\">https:\/\/www.german-economic-team.com<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Gligorov, Steve. &#8220;Advice From Washington To Macedonia: &#8216;The economy stupid!'&#8221; PelaNet, 2026. <a href=\"https:\/\/pelanet.mk\/?p=81465\">https:\/\/pelanet.mk\/?p=81465<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u2014\u2014\u2014. &#8220;Malum Consilium Consultori Pessimum: When a Bad EU Plan Backfires\u2014AI Asset Concentration, Eurozone Fragility, and North Macedonia&#8217;s Macroeconomic Risks.&#8221; PelaNet, 12 November 2026. <a href=\"https:\/\/pelanet.mk\/?p=82577\">https:\/\/pelanet.mk\/?p=82577<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u2014\u2014\u2014. &#8220;THE CULMINATING POINT OF ENLARGEMENT: Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, and the Strategic Attrition of the &#8216;8 SEPTEMBER 1991&#8217; Macedonian Pro-European Consensus.&#8221; PelaNet, 16 August 2026. <a href=\"https:\/\/pelanet.mk\/?p=81698\">https:\/\/pelanet.mk\/?p=81698<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Gligorov, Steve, and Ljupco Bosevski. &#8220;A Macedonian Blessing in Disguise: How Racial EU Exclusion and IMF Contagion Turn a Sovereign Trap into North Macedonia&#8217;s Ultimate Shield.&#8221; PelaNet, 20 October 2026. <a href=\"https:\/\/pelanet.mk\/?p=82329\">https:\/\/pelanet.mk\/?p=82329<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">International Monetary Fund. Republic of North Macedonia: 2026 Article IV Consultation. Press Release No. 26\/187. Washington, DC: IMF, 8 June 2026. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.imf.org\/en\/news\/articles\/2026\/06\/05\/pr-26187-republic-of-north-macedonia-imf-executive-board-concludes-2026-article-iv-consultation\">https:\/\/www.imf.org\/en\/news\/articles\/2026\/06\/05\/pr-26187-republic-of-north-macedonia-imf-executive-board-concludes-2026-article-iv-consultation<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u2014\u2014\u2014. Staff Concluding Statement of the 2026 Article IV Mission. 1 April 2026. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.imf.org\/en\/news\/articles\/2026\/03\/31\/mcs-04012026-north-macedonia-staff-concluding-statement-of-the-2026-article-iv-mission\">https:\/\/www.imf.org\/en\/news\/articles\/2026\/03\/31\/mcs-04012026-north-macedonia-staff-concluding-statement-of-the-2026-article-iv-mission<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Krugman, Paul. &#8220;After the Bubble Bursts.&#8221; Paul Krugman Substack, 8 November 2026. <a href=\"https:\/\/paulkrugman.substack.com\/p\/after-the-bubble-bursts\">https:\/\/paulkrugman.substack.com\/p\/after-the-bubble-bursts<\/a>.<br>\u2014\u2014\u2014. &#8220;Paul Krugman says billions in AI borrowing will hit a &#8216;Wile E. Coyote moment&#8217; as lenders get cold feet.&#8221; Yahoo Finance, 3 November 2026. <a href=\"https:\/\/au.finance.yahoo.com\">https:\/\/au.finance.yahoo.com<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Ministry of Finance of the Republic of North Macedonia. Review of Exports to Germany, 2024\u20132025. <a href=\"https:\/\/portal.mdt.gov.mk\">https:\/\/portal.mdt.gov.mk<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">National Bank of the Republic of North Macedonia. &#8220;Macroeconomic stability as a support to business\u2014meeting of the Governor Slaveski with the Economic Chamber.&#8221; 23 July 2025. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nbrm.mk\">https:\/\/www.nbrm.mk<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Nunes, Marcus. &#8220;It&#8217;s Not the Bubble, It&#8217;s the Spending.&#8221; Money Fetish (Substack), 9 November 2026. <a href=\"https:\/\/marcusnunes.substack.com\/p\/its-not-the-bubble-its-the-spending\">https:\/\/marcusnunes.substack.com\/p\/its-not-the-bubble-its-the-spending<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Oladosu, Gbadebo, Paul Leiby, David Bowman, Roc\u00edo Ur\u00eda-Mart\u00ednez, and Megan M. Johnson. &#8220;Impacts of Oil Price Shocks on the United States Economy: A Meta-Analysis of the Oil Price Elasticity of GDP for Net Oil-Importing Economies.&#8221; Energy Policy 115 (2018): 523\u2013544. <a href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1016\/j.enpol.2018.01.032\">https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1016\/j.enpol.2018.01.032<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">&#8220;Posthaste: Why an AI crash could be worse than the dot-com bubble bursting\u2014much worse.&#8221; Yahoo Finance \/ Financial Post, 10 November 2026. <a href=\"https:\/\/finance.yahoo.com\/news\/posthaste-why-ai-crash-could-125919973.html\">https:\/\/finance.yahoo.com\/news\/posthaste-why-ai-crash-could-125919973.html<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">State Statistical Office of the Republic of North Macedonia. Energy Balances, 2024 (preliminary data). 28 October 2025. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.stat.mk\">https:\/\/www.stat.mk<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">World Bank. &#8220;Debt Sustainability Framework.&#8221; <a href=\"https:\/\/www.worldbank.org\/en\/programs\/debt-sustainability-framework\">https:\/\/www.worldbank.org\/en\/programs\/debt-sustainability-framework<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Provenance and Citation Note<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">On the PelaNet corpus. The four Gligorov texts cited in footnotes 1\u20134 are opinion and commentary published under PelaNet&#8217;s standard disclaimer that the views are the authors&#8217; own. They are cited here as the source of the framework being calibrated, not as peer-reviewed evidence. All four footnotes point to the English-language versions of the texts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u041f\u0438\u0448\u0443\u0432\u0430 \u043e\u0434 \u0412\u0430\u0448\u0438\u043d\u0433\u0442\u043e\u043d, \u0414.\u0426., \u0421\u0410\u0414, STEVE GLIGOROV, J.D., Esq., B.S., Cert. in Int\u2019l Trade Law &amp; Int\u2019l Comm. Arb., Original Co-Founder of the United Macedonian Diaspora<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Calibrating the Twin Shock: The Energy and AI-Capex Correction on North Macedonia&#8217;s GDP JEL classification:&#8230;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":82629,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"om_disable_all_campaigns":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_uf_show_specific_survey":0,"_uf_disable_surveys":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[31],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-82630","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-31"],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/pelanet.mk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/82630","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/pelanet.mk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/pelanet.mk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pelanet.mk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pelanet.mk\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=82630"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/pelanet.mk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/82630\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":82631,"href":"https:\/\/pelanet.mk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/82630\/revisions\/82631"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pelanet.mk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/82629"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/pelanet.mk\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=82630"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pelanet.mk\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=82630"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pelanet.mk\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=82630"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}